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Abstract
The author models the choice between credit cards and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs)
within a framework where consumers hold lines of credit as instruments of consumption
smoothing across state and time. Flexible repayment schemes for lines of credit induce risk-
averse consumers with sufﬁciently high discount rates to underinsure and hold lines of credit
instead as a buffer, even when they have access to full and fair insurance markets. Weighing the
ﬁxed upfront fees and higher default costs of HELOCs against the advantages of low and income-
tax-deductible interest payments, the author ﬁnds a threshold level of potential borrowing below
which consumers prefer to use credit cards exclusively. Above that threshold, consumers decide to
use HELOCs and consolidate all outstanding credit card debt into them; however, a rising
probability of default and the resulting loss of equity in the home will put an upper bound on the
potential HELOC borrowing that will prevent full debt consolidation.
JEL classiﬁcation: D1, D81
Bank classiﬁcation: Credit and credit aggregates
Résumé
Postulant que les consommateurs recourent aux lignes de crédit pour lisser leur consommation au
ﬁl du temps et des circonstances, l’auteur modélise les conditions qui les amènent à emprunter à
l’aide d’une carte de crédit ou d’une marge de crédit garantie par l’avoir propre foncier. La
souplesse des plans de remboursement dont sont assorties les lignes de crédit incite les
consommateurs peu enclins au risque et ayant un taux d’actualisation assez élevé à s’en servir
comme tampon et à ne pas s’assurer contre certains risques, même s’ils ont accès à un marché de
l’assurance complet et concurrentiel. Une fois mis en balance les coûts associés aux marges de
crédit garanties par l’avoir foncier (coûts de défaillance plus élevés et frais ﬁxes initiaux) et les
avantages qu’elles offrent (taux d’intérêt plus faible et déductibilité des paiements d’intérêts),
l’auteur montre qu’en deçà d’un certain seuil d’emprunt potentiel, les ménages préfèrent s’en
tenir à leur carte de crédit. Passé ce seuil, ces derniers choisissent de transférer à leur marge de
crédit tous leurs emprunts sur carte de crédit. Cependant, puisque le risque de défaillance — et
donc le risque de perdre l’avoir foncier — augmente avec le montant de dette accumulé sur la
marge de crédit, il existe également un plafond au niveau d’emprunt potentiel sur la marge de
crédit, ce qui empêchera le regroupement de la totalité des dettes.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D1, D81
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Crédit et agrégats du crédit  1 
1.  Introduction 
Consumers in the United States today have a choice of two major lines of credit: credit 
cards and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs).  Over 72 per cent of American households 
have at least one bank-type credit card, and about 15 per cent of homeowners have a HELOC, 
although the rate of growth of HELOCs is currently much greater than that of credit cards (U.S. 
Federal Reserve Board 2001; Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore 2003).  A line of credit, as 
opposed to a traditional loan, extends a fixed amount of credit to a borrower, and it is then the 
borrower’s decision regarding when and how much of that credit to utilize.  Previous literature in 
this area has considered the transactions and the precautionary motives for holding lines of 
credit a nd their use within the life-cycle hypothesis.  In this paper, I further explore the 
precautionary motive or the motive to use lines of credit as a buffer against uninsured or 
uninsurable risks.  I work within a set-up of an insurance market that offers consumers full and 
actuarially fair insurance.  The framework shows how lines of credit can be used as a hedge 
against optimally uninsured risks.  Given the repayment scheme, the rate of interest on lines of 
credit, and the probability of a wealth loss, even if a consumer has access to full and actuarially 
fair insurance, it may be optimal to leave a portion of the risks uninsured and hold lines of credit 
instead as a buffer.  If the wealth loss occurs and the consumer resorts to borrowing on lines of 
credit to cover for the uninsured part, the benefit of not paying a full insurance premium and 
repaying the debt on lines of credit over time will outweigh the cost if the consumer has a 
sufficiently high discount rate.  When the consumer optimally chooses to buy full insurance, lines 
of credit may still be used to smooth out consumption across time periods.  I therefore 
investigate the principal motives for borrowing on lines of credit in a way that has not been 
previously done in the literature. 
Facing a choice between credit cards and HELOCs, a consumer must weigh the costs 
and advantages of each.  Although HELOCs have the advantage of lower and tax-deductible 
interest rates, their non-interest costs are a disadvantage.  I will show that the choice of line of 
credit to use depends on the amount that the consumer potentially wishes to borrow.  Since 
some consumers will hold lines of credit as a buffer against optimally uninsured risks, a part of 
the borrowing on lines of credit will be state-dependent; hence, there is a need to differentiate   2 
between actual and potential borrowing.  Below some threshold level of potential borrowing, 
the costs associated with HELOCs outweigh the interest rate and income tax advantages, and at 
that point consumers prefer to use credit cards exclusively. 
I also examine why a consumer who has incurred the fixed cost of obtaining a HELOC
1 
and has not yet fully utilized the line would continue to borrow on high-rate credit cards—a 
puzzling phenomenon that is often observed in the data.
2  I find that a rising probability of default 
and the resulting loss of equity in the home impose an upper bound on the potential HELOC 
borrowing that the consumer wishes to undertake, which in turn will optimally prevent full debt 
consolidation into HELOC.  Moreover, since it is argued that consumers take out lines of credit 
in anticipation of the wealth losses they may incur, which is to say that they care about the 
potential debt to be carried on their credit lines, the upper bound on the potential HELOC 
borrowing also explains why some consumers have both types of credit lines and carry positive 
debt only on their credit cards. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research and provides 
background on lines of credit.  Section 3 introduces the theoretical model.  Section 4 offers 
some conclusions. 
 
2.  Previous Research and Background 
Ausubel (1991) was among the first to initiate research on the credit card market.  He 
argues that some consumers borrow on high-rate credit cards because they underestimate their 
likelihood of carrying balances.  Brito and Hartley (1995), however, propose that consumers 
borrow on high-rate credit cards because alternative consumer loans involve transactions costs.  
Mester (1994) argues that low-risk borrowers leave the credit card market in favour of low-
interest collateralized loans, thereby making the credit card client pool riskier and preventing 
interest rates from falling.  Park (1997) explains the downward stickiness of credit card interest 
rates using the option value of credit lines.  He shows that the interest rate that produces zero 
                                                 
1 Such as an appraisal fee, lawyer fee, or points. 
2 See the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, available at 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html>.   3 
profit for card issuers is higher than interest rates on most other loans because rational 
cardholders borrow more money when they become riskier.  An empirical paper by Calem and 
Mester (1995) finds evidence for consumers’ reluctance to search for lower rates due to high 
search costs in this market.  Cargill and Wendel (1996) suggest that, since there are a large 
number of convenience users in the credit card market, even modest search costs could keep 
the majority of consumers from seeking out lower interest rates.  Gross and Souleles (2002) 
utilize a unique new dataset on credit card accounts to analyze how people respond to changes 
in credit supply.  They find that increases in credit limits generate an immediate and significant 
rise in debt, consistent with the buffer-stock models of precautionary saving, as cited in Deaton 
(1991), Carroll (1992), and Ludvigson (1999).  Agarwal, Ambrose, and Liu (Forthcoming) test 
the relationship between credit quality and credit line utilization.  Their empirical analysis 
supports the fact that borrowers with higher expectations of future credit quality deterioration 
originate credit lines and utilize them at lower rates to preserve financial flexibility.  Dey and 
Mumy (2005) emphasize the difference between credit limit and credit utilization, and point out 
the possible credit misallocation that could result from the information asymmetry generated by 
this difference. 
  General features of the HELOC market are documented by Canner, Fergus, and 
Luckett (1988); DeMong and Lindgren (1990); Canner and Luckett (1994); Canner, Durkin, 
and Luckett (1998); and Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003).  Eugeni (1993) examines 
the tax and interest advantages of HELOCs.  Motivations for using HELOCs are also 
investigated by Chen and Jensen (1985), who analyze HELOCs in the life-cycle consumption-
saving plan; Delaney (1994), who explains HELOC use as a way to tap into the forced savings 
induced by mortgage payments; and Salandro and Harrison (1997), who empirically determine 
the demand for HELOCs as a function of financial and socioeconomic characteristics.  Agarwal 
et al. (Forthcoming) provide an empirical analysis of home equity loan and line performance.  
They find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest 
rates, whereas those with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.  
Finally, Dey and Dunn (2005) show how banks use the loan-to-value ratio as a signal of 
borrower quality to sort and price risk in the HELOC market.   4 
2.1  Lines of credit as an alternative to full insurance 
Beyond their standard use as instruments of consumption smoothing across time 
periods, lines of credit can play a role in consumers’ risk management.  Most risks are financed 
by traditional insurance; consumers, however, often do not buy insurance to cover themselves 
against wage-income risks and all possible medical risks, even if there are insurance markets 
that potentially provide full and fair insurance.  Consumers may choose to leave these risks 
uncovered simply because they have access to lines of credit.  A major motive for holding lines 
of credit is to replace traditional insurance.  Eisenhauer (1994) examines the role that lines of 
credit can play in consumers’ risk management.  He models a framework with full but unfair 
insurance, where consumers optimally leave some risks uninsured and resort to lines of credit to 
cover the uninsured losses.  His model does not consider the ability to repay debt on lines of 
credit over time; i.e., repayment flexibility.  In the next section, I will show how being asked to 
repay only a small fraction of the outstanding debt induces consumers who face full and fair 
insurance and have sufficiently high rates of discount to optimally keep some wealth losses 
uninsured and hold lines of credit instead as a buffer. 
 
3.  The Theoretical Model 
  I model a typical consumer’s choice of borrowing on lines of credit as a lifetime utility 
maximization problem in an environment of risk.
3  I consider three different scenarios: 
(i)  The consumer can borrow only on credit cards. 
(ii)  The consumer can borrow only on HELOCs. 
(iii)  The consumer can borrow on credit cards and HELOCs. 
We consider two time periods: 0 and 1.  The world begins with the beginning of period 0 and 
ends with the end of period 1.  The consumer knows right from the very beginning that in period 
0 (the time during which the consumer is assumed to be working full-time) they face a possible 
reduction of wealth, such as a wage-income risk or health risk.  In period 1 (the time during 
which the consumer is secured against income or medical risk by some public safety net
4), 
                                                 
3 We exclude convenience use or the use of lines of credit solely for transaction purposes. 
4 Such as the social security safety net.   5 
consumption is determined by a certain income, government-provided medical benefits, the 
consumer’s net worth,
5 and the consumer’s bankruptcy status.  Hence, in the beginning of 
period 0, a consumer faces four possible states of the world: no-default-loss, no-default-no-
loss, default-loss, and default-no-loss.  The consumer has an instantaneous utility function, U, 
such that  , 0 > ¢ U   . 0 < ¢ ¢ U  The variables used in the model are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Wt – Wealth of the consumer at time t  t – Income tax rate; 0 < t < 1 
L – Loss; L > 0  d –Discount factor; 0 < d < 1 
q – Insurance coverage  a – Required rate of repayment; 0 < a < 1 
p – Probability of the Loss  rC – Credit card interest rate 
s
C – Probability of default on credit cards  rH –HELOC interest rate 
s
H – Probability of default on HELOCs  t – Fixed cost of HELOC; t > 0 
 
The market for lines of credit that I deal with is realistically assumed to have the 
following institutional background.  Since the world begins with the beginning of period 0, the 
consumer starts with a wealth endowment of W0 (which includes their net worth and the wage 
income), and in period 1 their wealth is equivalent to a certain and predetermined income, 
government-provided medical benefits, and their net worth.  Therefore, the periodic wealth of 
the consumer (Wt) is exogenously determined.  Credit cards are unsecured lines of credit: if the 
consumer fails to repay any outstanding credit card debt, they will lose all their non-exempt 
assets, which usually consist of their entire f inancial wealth.  Hence, the value of the wealth 
retained by the consumer after defaulting on credit card debt in period 1 is given by gCW1, 
where 0 < gC < 1.  Moreover, the legal default procedure discharges all outstanding debt that 
the consumer may have at the time of default.
6  In the event of a default on HELOCs, the equity 
in the home also becomes non-exempt from creditors; HELOCs therefore have higher default 
                                                 
5 This is the difference between gross assets and liabilities. 
6 The assumption is that consumers declare bankruptcy under the legal protection of Chapter 7 of the 
bankruptcy code, where the bankrupt consumers get a fresh start.   6 
costs, because the consumer can only retain wealth of amount gHW1 in period 1, where 0 < gH < 
1 and  gH < gC.  The interest rate on credit cards (rC) is greater than the interest rate on 
HELOCs (rH).
7  Moreover, I assume that the consumer can lend at the same rate as they 
borrow.
8  The required rate of repayment (a) is the same for HELOCs and credit cards.
9  I 
also assume that the consumer pays back at the required rate, which is again a simplifying 
assumption, though not very unrealistic for the majority of HELOC borrowers and some credit 
card borrowers.  I further assume that insurance is full and actuarially fair, so that the insurance 
premium = pq. 
 
3.1  The choice of borrowing on credit cards 
Suppose that the consumer has only credit cards available for borrowing.  This would 
occur if the consumer does not own a home with positive equity or does not own a home at all.  
Let (1 – a)B
10 denote the amount of credit card debt incurred in period 0, irrespective of 
whether wealth loss occurs.  A consumer can potentially carry a debt of amount D = (1 – a)(B 
+ (L – q)) on their credit card in period 0, where (1 – a)(L – q) is the extra borrowing that the 
consumer may need to cover for any shortfall as a result of a wealth loss, L.  The probability of 
default is given by s
C = (1 – p) Prob(W1 < (1 + rC)(1 – a)B) + p Prob(W1 < (1 + rC)(1 – a)(B 
+ (L – q))), such that sB
C > 0, sBB
C > 0, sq
C < 0, and sqq
C < 0.  The consumer’s discounted 
expected lifetime utility in the event of no default on credit card debt is given by 
  V
NDC = V0




C = (1  – p )  U(W0 – B pq ) 1 ( a - + ) +p U(W0 – B pq ) 1 ( a - + – ) ( q L- a ) and
  V1
NDC = (1 – p ) U(W1 – B rC ) 1 )( 1 ( a - + ) 
          + p U(W1 – )) ( )( 1 )( 1 ( q L B rC - + - + a ). 
                                                 
7 This is usually the case except for introductory credit card offers, which are excluded from this analysis. 
8 This is a simplifying assumption, invoked for the sake of completeness. 
9 The required rate of repayment is usually between 2–5 per cent of outstanding balances on both types of 
credit lines. 
10 If B is negative, then the consumer saves the amount – (1 – a)B.  In other words, I assume that savers get 
back a part of their savings (–aB) for consumption in period 0.   7 
The consumer’s discounted expected lifetime utility in the event of a default on credit card debt 
is given by 
  V
DC = V0




DC = (1 – p ) U(gCW1) 
                    + p U(gCW1) = U(gCW1). 
The consumer’s discounted expected lifetime utility is given by 
  V





       = V0





The consumer then faces the following optimization problem: 
A.  Maximize V
C by choosing q and B. 
Differentiating V
C with respect to q and setting it to zero gives 
  p (1 – p ) U¢(
C
N C
0 ) = p (a– p ) U'(
C
L C





            – d sq
C [V1
NDC – V1
DC]        (1) 
The variable 
i
jk C  represents consumption, where the superscripts  C and  H represent, 
respectively, credit cards and HELOCs, the subscripts L and N indicate loss and no-loss, the 
subscripts  NDL and  NDN indicate no-default-loss and no-default-no-loss states, and the 
subscripts 0 and 1 represent the time periods. 
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The concavity of the utility function implies that 
d < d
AC ￿ 
* q < L.
11 
Differentiating V
C with respect to B gives 
  B









 that is, if 
                                                 
11 The superscript 
* represents the optimal level of consumer’s choice variable when using credit cards.  See 
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The following results are obtained: 
 
(i)  If d < Min [d
AC, d
BC], then q
* < L and B
* > 0. 
(ii)  If d
BC < d < d
AC, then q
* < L and B
* = 0. 
(iii)  If d
AC < d < d
BC, then q
* = L and B
* > 0. 
(iv)  If d > Max [d
AC, d
BC], then q
* = L and B
* = 0. 
 
Given the repayment scheme, the rate of interest on credit cards, and the probability of the 
wealth loss, if the consumer has a sufficiently low discount factor (as described in results (i) and 
(ii)), then they will optimally want to underinsure (even in the presence of full and actuarially fair 
insurance) in period 0 and hold credit cards instead as a buffer.  If the consumer experiences the 
wealth loss and resorts to borrowing on credit cards to cover for the uninsured part, the benefit 
from not paying the full insurance premium and repaying the credit card debt over time will 
outweigh the interest and expected default costs when the consumer’s discount factor is lower 
than d
AC.  Results (iii) and (iv) describe the case where the consumer fully insures against the 
wealth loss,  L.  Borrowings on credit cards can occur (as shown in results (i) and (iii)) 
irrespective of whether the wealth loss occurs, if the consumer’s discount factor lies below d
BC. 
 
3.2  The choice of borrowing on HELOCs 
Suppose that the consumer has only HELOCs available for borrowing.  HELOCs have 
low and income-tax-deductible interest rates; however, they carry non-interest costs, such as 
fixed or upfront costs (t).  The new probability of default is given by s
H = (1 – p) Prob(W1 < (1 





H < 0, sBB
C > sBB
H > 0, and sqq
C < sqq
H < 0.  The consumer’s discounted expected 
lifetime utility in the event of no default on HELOC debt is given by 
  V
NDH = V0
H + d V1
NDH, where
   9 
V0
H = (1 – p ) U(W0 – B pq ) 1 ( a - + – t) +  
           p U(W0 – B pq ) 1 ( a - + – ) ( q L- a – t) and 
V1
NDH = (1 – p ) U(W1 – B t rH ) 1 ))( 1 ( 1 ( a - - + ) + 
               p U(W1 – )) ( )( 1 ))( 1 ( 1 ( q L B t rH - + - - + a ). 








DH = (1 – p ) U(gHW1) 
                    + p U(gHW1) = U(gHW1). 
The consumer’s discounted expected lifetime utility is given by 
  V





       = V0





Here, the consumer faces the following optimization problem: 
A.  Maximize V
H by choosing q and B. 
Differentiating V
H with respect to q and setting it to zero gives 
  p (1 – p ) U¢(
H
N C
0 ) = p (a– p ) U'(
H
L C
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The concavity of the utility function implies that 
d < d
AH ￿ 
* * q < L.
12 
Differentiating V
H with respect to B gives 
                                                 
12 The superscript 
** represents the optimal level of consumer’s choice variable when using HELOCs.   10 
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The following results are obtained: 
 
(i)  If d < Min [d
AH, d
BH], then q
** < L and B
** > 0. 
(ii)  If d
BH < d < d
AH, then q
** < L and B
** = 0. 
(iii)  If d
AH < d < d
BH, then q
** = L and B
** > 0. 
(iv)  If d > Max [d
AH, d
BH], then q
** = L and B
** = 0. 
 
Given the repayment scheme, the rate of interest on HELOCs, and the probability of the wealth 
loss, if the consumer has a sufficiently low discount factor (as described in results (v) and (vi)), 
then they will optimally want to underinsure in period 0 and hold HELOCs instead as a buffer.  
If the consumer experiences the wealth loss and resorts to borrowing on HELOCs to cover for 
the uninsured part, the benefit from not paying the full insurance premium and repaying the 
HELOC debt over time will outweigh the interest and expected default costs when the 
consumer’s discount factor is lower than d
AH.  Results (vii) and (viii) describe the case where 
the consumer fully insures against the wealth loss, L.  Borrowings on HELOCs can occur (as 
shown in results (v) and (vii)) irrespective of whether the wealth loss occurs, if the consumer’s 
discount factor lies below d
BH. 
 
3.3  The choice of borrowing with access to credit cards and HELOCs 
Suppose that the consumer has access to both credit cards and HELOCs.  The 
consumer is faced with two decisions: (i) whether the low-interest but otherwise costly HELOC 
should actually be acquired, and (ii) if a HELOC is acquired in addition to a credit card, the 
amount of debt to put on each.  In conducting this analysis, it is important to remember the costs   11 
and benefits associated with the two borrowing instruments the consumer has access to.  
HELOCs have lower and income-tax-deductible interest charges.  They also, however, involve 
fixed costs, and since they are secured by the equity in the home, defaulting on them incurs 
higher costs in terms of loss of wealth in period 1 (i.e., gHW1 < gCW1). 
The discounted expected lifetime utility from not acquiring a HELOC and potentially 
carrying a debt of amount D = (1 – a)(B + (L – q)) on a credit card is given by 
  V





       = V0





For D = 0, s
C = 0 and V
C = U(W0 – pL) + dU(W1). 
The discounted expected lifetime utility from potentially borrowing the same amount of 
D only on a HELOC is given by 
V





     = V0





Similarly, for D = 0, s
H = 0 and V
H = U(W0 – pL – t) + dU(W1). 
Hence, " t > 0 and for D = 0, V
H – V
C < 0.  In other words, given the positive fixed costs of 
obtaining HELOCs, the consumer will never consider borrowing on a HELOC unless they 
anticipate a positive desired debt. 
I next draw upon the following sufficient conditions that are assumed to represent the 
situation for a consumer who has access to both types of lines of credit, thus generating 
empirically observed consumer behaviour. 
 











To explore what Condition 1 actually entails with respect to a consumer’s utility calculations, I 
first redefine the default probabilities and the discounted lifetime utility functions in terms of the 
potential debt, D.  The probability of default for credit cards is given by s
C = (1 – p) Prob(W1 
< (1 + rC)(D – (1 – a)(L – q))) + p Prob(W1 < (1 + rC)D), such that sD
C > 0 and sDD
C > 0.  
Similarly, the probability of default for HELOCs is given by s
H = (1 – p) Prob(W1 < (1 + rH (1   12 
– t))(D – (1 – a)(L – q))) + p Prob(W1 < ((1 + rH (1 – t))D), such that sD
C > sD
H > 0 and sDD
C 
> sDD
H > 0.  Also, 
V0
C = (1 – p ) U(W0 – ) )( 1 ( q L D pq - - - + a )  
       + p U(W0 – D pq + – ) ( q L - ), 
  V1
NDC = (1 – p ) U(W1 – )) )( 1 ( )( 1 ( q L D rC - - - + a ) 
                      + p U(W1 – D rC) 1 ( + ), 
V1
DC = U(gCW1), and 
  V
C = V0







H = (1 – p ) U(W0 – ) )( 1 ( q L D pq - - - + a – t)  
       + p U(W0 – D pq + – ) ( q L - – t), 
  V1
NDH = (1 – p ) U(W1 – )) )( 1 ( ))( 1 ( 1 ( q L D t rH - - - - + a ) 
                      + p U(W1 – D t rH )) 1 ( 1 ( - + ), 
V1
DH = U(gHW1), and 
  V
H = V0





Imposing Condition 1 is equivalent to assuming that , 0 D D < £ "  







C C U p C U p s r  







H C U p C U p s t r  




D V V s V V s - - -  
In other words, Condition 1 implies that , 0 D D < £ " the gain in expected utility owing to lower 
and income-tax-deductible interest payments from putting a dollar into HELOCs instead of 
credit cards in the event of no default is greater than the loss of expected utility, due to higher 
default costs associated with HELOCs. 
I next impose Condition 2, which implies that a rising probability of defaulting on 
HELOCs, and thereby losing the equity in the home, as well, eventually makes HELOCs 
unfavourable for consolidating debt away from credit cards: 
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I then impose a final condition: 
 
Condition 3: There exists a particular level of borrowing,  , D  such that 
, 0 D D < < 0 ) ( = -
=D D
C H V V  and  . , 0 D D V V
C H > " > -  
 
Condition 3 assumes that, starting from a negative value at D = 0, V
H – V
C becomes zero at 
) , 0 ( D D˛  and stays positive at all values of D after that.  Figure 1 illustrates the trade-offs 
facing the consumer that Conditions 1 to 3 delineate. 
 
Figure 1: The Choice of Lines of Credit 
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If the consumer has actually acquired a credit card and a HELOC, then the new discounted 
expected lifetime utility from potentially borrowing D is given by 
V
B = V0







B = (1 – p ) U(W0 – ) )( 1 ( q L D D pq
H C - - - + + a – t)  
       + p U(W0 –
H C D D pq + + – ) ( q L - – t), 
  V1
NDB = (1 – p )  
U(W1 – - - - - + )) )( 1 ( )( 1 (
C C
C q L D r a )) )( 1 ( ))( 1 ( 1 (
H H
H q L D t r - - - - + a ) 
                      + p U(W1 – - +
C
C D r ) 1 (
H
H D t r )) 1 ( 1 ( - + ), 
  V1





In the expressions above, D
C = (1 – a)(B
C + (L – q
C)) is the credit card debt, D
H = (1 – a)(B
H 
+ (L – q
H)) is the HELOC debt, and D
C + D
H = D = (1 – a)(B + (L – q)).  Moreover, B
C and 
B
H are state-independent credit card and HELOC borrowings, respectively, such that B
C + B
H 
= B.  Therefore, the insurance coverages q
C and q
H are such that (L – q
C) + (L – q
H) = L – q.  
Finally, the new probability of default when the consumer has taken out both lines of credit is 
given by  
  =
B s (1 – p) Prob + - - - + < )) )( 1 ( )( 1 ( ( 1
C C
C q L D r W a  
           ))) )( 1 ( ))( 1 ( 1 (
H H
H q L D t r - - - - + a + 
           p Prob 1 (W + + <
C
C D r ) 1 (
H
H D t r )) 1 ( 1 ( - + ), such that  










D D H H H C C C s s s . 
From the foregoing analysis of consumer’s choice under the three different scenarios, given my 
assumptions and using Conditions 1, 2, and 3, I obtain the following results: 
 
    (i) D > 0, if d < Max [d
AC, d
BC], 
   (ii)  , 0 > > ’ D D such that  0 ) ( = -
=D D
C H V V , 
      (iii) For D < D, V
H – V
C < 0, 
(iv) For D > D, V
H – V
C > 0, and   15 
(v) For D D D > ‡ ,  .
,
C H
D D D D D
B V V V
H C > ‡
= - =  
 
The results that capture the borrowing decisions on lines of credit within a framework of 
consumption smoothing across state and time can be summarized as follows.  The consumer 
desires to borrow on lines of credit, such as credit cards, if they are sufficiently impatient (i.e., if 
d < Max [d
AC, d
BC]).  The upfront fixed costs associated with HELOCs prevent the consumer 
from using them for small amounts of potential debt; i.e., for D D < .  The consumer uses credit 
cards exclusively for all borrowing needs belowD.  For all  potential debt levels below a 
certain upper bound (i.e., D D < " ), transferring balances away from high-interest credit cards 
and into HELOCs is beneficial.  Therefore, for these intermediate levels of potential debt, the 
consumer prefers to use HELOCs exclusively for all their borrowing needs.  Finally, for very 
large levels of  potential debt (i.e., for D D D > ‡ ), a rising probability of defaulting on 
HELOCs and thereby losing the equity in the home, as well, eventually makes HELOCs 
unfavourable for consolidating debt away from credit cards.  In these situations, I find that the 
consumer is induced to carry debt on both credit cards and HELOCs. 
  Moreover, I often find in the data that there are consumers who have taken out both 
credit cards and HELOCs and yet are carrying a positive balance only on their credit cards.  
Since the potential debt to be carried is the relevant variable for the choice of lines of credit, a 
consumer with both lines of credit and a positive balance carried on credit cards alone could be 
considered to anticipate a very large level of  potential debt (i.e., D D D > ‡ ), so that 
transferring balances away from high-interest credit cards and into HELOCs is not beneficial. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper has modelled the choice consumers have between the two major lines of 
credit—credit cards and HELOCs—in a framework where consumers hold lines of credit as 
instruments of consumption smoothing across state and time.  Even when consumers have 
access to full and actuarially fair insurance, it may be optimal for them to leave a portion of the 
risks that they face uninsured and hold lines of credit instead as a buffer.  For a consumer with a   16 
sufficiently high discount rate, if the anticipated wealth loss actually occurs and they resort to 
borrowing on lines of credit to cover for the uninsured part, the benefit of not paying a full 
insurance premium and repaying the debt on lines of credit over time will outweigh the cost. 
Given the costs and advantages of the different lines of credit, I find that the choice 
between credit cards and HELOCs depends on the amount of borrowing that consumers 
potentially wish to undertake.  For small levels of potential borrowings, my theoretical model 
shows that consumers will prefer to use credit cards exclusively, and for intermediate levels they 
will use only HELOCs.  This finding includes those who replace their credit card debt by fully 
consolidating into HELOCs.  When the potential borrowing level reaches a certain threshold, 
however, a rising probability of defaulting on HELOCs and thereby losing the equity in the 
home, as well, will eventually make HELOCs unfavourable for consolidating debt away from 
credit cards.  In these situations, I find that consumers will be induced to carry debt on both 
credit cards and HELOCs.  Thus, I find a rational explanation for the observed phenomenon of 
consumers carrying debt on both HELOCs and credit cards.  Moreover, since I argue that the 
consumers take out lines of credit in anticipation of wealth losses that they may incur, which is to 
say that they care about the potential debt to be carried on their lines, the upper bound on the 
potential HELOC borrowing also explains why some consumers have both lines of credit and 
carry positive debt only on their credit cards. 
Previous research has focused on the role lines of credit play in smoothing consumption 
across time periods, and the role they play in precautionary purposes when the insurance 
market is either not full or not fair.  I have delineated a precautionary role for lines of credit 
even in an environment of full and actuarially fair insurance.  Moreover, I have explained why a 
consumer who has incurred the fixed cost of obtaining a HELOC and has not yet fully utilized 
the line would continue to borrow on high-rate credit cards.  If the use of lines of credit 
continues to grow at the current unprecedented rate, their full incorporation into traditional 
economic models will become critical to a complete understanding of the complex behaviour 
underlying consumption, savings, and demand for money. 
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix, I numerically solve the consumer’s utility maximization problem when they have 
only credit cards to use as a buffer against uninsured wealth losses.  For my numerical example, 
I set the values of the model’s variables using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, 2001 









s = 2.  I also assume that B = $1000.  Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, 2001, I take 
the median credit card borrowing for 2001 to be $1,900, and the median income of a 
household to be $40,000.  Assuming that the household faces only wage-income risk, I set L = 
$40,000 and p as the average unemployment rate of 2001, which is 0.05.  Using the assumed 
value of B and the fact that (1 – a)(B + (L – q)) = $1,900, I get q = $39,000.  The median 
household net worth in 2001 is $86,000.  Therefore, I have W0 = $126,000.  I set W1 as the 
sum of the median net worth and the median income of the age group 65–74 of the year 2001, 
which is $204,000.  The median value of financial assets of this age group is $51,000.  Hence, 
gC =
000 , 204 $
000 , 51 $
1- = 0.75.  Using the values of the variables set as above, I can write the 
probability of default, s
C =  ] 000 , 40 ,$ 0 [ ; ) , , , , , , , (
2
1 0 ˛ - = q
b
q
a L B r W W p q f C a and where 
the constants a > 0 and b > 0, thus satisfying sq
C < 0 and sqq
C < 0.  Assuming that (i) s
C at q = 
$39,000 is equal to the bankruptcy rate of 2001, which is 0.005, and (ii) if q = $40,000, the 
median credit card debt and the bankruptcy rate of 2001 would be half their current levels, I get 
a = 0.05 and b = $31,600,000.  The insurance premium pq = (0.05)$39,000 = $1,950 and sq
C 
at q = $39,000 is –0.003.  Hence, the sufficient condition for having the optimal q = $39,000 < 

















- - ¢ - - +
¢ -
<
] [ ) ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (




  . 64 . 0 = <
AC d d  Bank of Canada Working Papers
Documents de travail de la Banque du Canada
Working papers are generally published in the language of the author, with an abstract in both ofﬁcial
languages. Les documents de travail sont publiés généralement dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs; ils sont
cependant précédés d’un résumé bilingue.
Copies and a complete list of working papers are available from:
Pour obtenir des exemplaires et une liste complète des documents de travail, prière de s’adresser à :
Publications Distribution, Bank of Canada Diffusion des publications, Banque du Canada
234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0G9 234, rue Wellington, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0G9
E-mail: publications@bankofcanada.ca  Adresse électronique : publications@banqueducanada.ca
Web site: http://www.bankofcanada.ca Site Web : http://www.banqueducanada.ca
2005
2005-17 Risk Perceptions and Attitudes M. Misina
2005-16 Endogenous Central Bank Credibility in a Small Forward-Looking
Model of the U.S. Economy R. Lalonde
2005-15 Learning-by-Doing or Habit Formation? H. Bouakez and T. Kano
2005-14 Labour Market Adjustments to Exchange Rate Fluctuations:
Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing Industries D. Leung and T. Yuen
2005-13 Efﬁciency and Economies of Scale of Large Canadian Banks J. Allen and Y. Liu
2005-12 Do Exchange Rates Affect the Capital-Labour Ratio?
Panel Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing Industries D. Leung and T. Yuen
2005-11 An Analysis of Closure Policy under Alternative
Regulatory Structures G. Caldwell
2005-10 Educational Spillovers: Does One Size Fit All? R. Baumann and R. Solomon
2005-9 State Dependence in Fundamentals and Preferences
Explains Risk-Aversion Puzzle F. Chabi-Yo, R. Garcia, and E. Renault
2005-8 Recent Developments in Self-Employment in Canada N. Kamhi and D. Leung
2005-7 Determinants of Borrowing Limits on Credit Cards S. Dey and G. Mumy
2005-6 Monetary Policy under Model and Data-Parameter Uncertainty G. Cateau
2005-5 Y a-t-il eu surinvestissement au Canada durant la seconde moitié
des années 1990? S. Martel
2005-4 State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing:
Does It Matter for Recent U.S. Inﬂation? P.J. Klenow and O. Kryvtsov
2005-3 Pre-Bid Run-Ups Ahead of Canadian Takeovers:
How Big Is the Problem? M.R. King and M. Padalko
2005-2 The Stochastic Discount Factor: Extending the Volatility
Bound and a New Approach to Portfolio Selection with
Higher-Order Moments F. Chabi-Yo, R. Garcia, and E. Renault
2005-1 Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle C. Calmès